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Among mindfulness measures the three constructs acceptance, decentering, and
non-attachment are psychometrically closely related, despite their apparent semantic
differences. These three facets present robust psychometric features and can be
considered core themes inmost “third wave” clinical models. The aim of the present study
was to explore the apparently different content domains (acceptance, decentering, and
non-attachment) by administering various psychometric scales in a large sample of 608
volunteers. Resilience and depression were also assessed. Exploratory and confirmatory
factor analyses performed in two randomly selected subsamples showed a bifactor
approximation. The explained common variance suggested a unidimensional nature for
the general factor, with good psychometric properties, which we named “Delusion of
Me” (DoM). This construct is also strongly correlated with resilience and depression, and
appears to be a solid latent general construct closely related to the concept of “ego.”
DoM emerges as a potentially transdiagnostic construct with influence on well-being
and clinical indexes such as resilience and depression. Further studies should analyze
the potential utility of this new construct at a therapeutic level.
Keywords: mindfulness, acceptance, decentering, non-attachment, depression, resilience
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, mindfulness has become an important health-related concept, and the absence
of mindfulness has been consistently associated with clinical symptoms, both medical and
psychological (1, 2). By contrast, the presence of mindfulness has been positively correlated
with quality of life and well-being (3–6). Traditionally, mindfulness is considered to contain
two main components: (1) self-regulation of attention and (2) an attitude of acceptance (7).
Currently available measures of mindfulness are highly heterogeneous assessing as few as a single
characteristic of mindfulness (8) to up to nine distinctive features (9). Given this heterogeneity,
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together with other controversial aspects such as diverse
theoretical backgrounds, differences in the definitions used in
these scales, the trait or state debate, and the question of to what
extent mindfulness is trainable (10–13), it is not surprising that
relationship between the various mindfulness scales is generally
poor, particularly in the case of dispositional mindfulness and
non-experienced populations (14). Importantly, this lack of
consistency between these instruments does not apply to all
of the sub-facets and by-products of mindfulness practice. In
fact, certain aspects such as acceptance, decentering, and non-
attachment are all highly correlated.
Several instruments are available to assess measures for each
of these three domains. In the most commonly used mindfulness
questionnaire—the “Five Facets Mindfulness Questionnaire”
[FFMQ, (15)]—acceptance is best represented by accepting
without judgment, which refers to taking a non-evaluative
stance toward the feelings and thoughts. Nevertheless, the
developer of the FFMQ originally suggested that non-reacting
together with non-judging of inner experience both represent
acceptance (16). Several studies have shown a significant overlap
between the non-reacting and the decentering constructs, which
consistently correlate with each other, even more so than with
the non-judging facet (10, 17, 18). Likewise, the non-judging
subscale strongly correlates with other measures of acceptance,
such as experiential avoidance in the “Acceptance and Action
Questionnaire-II” (AAQ-II) and the acceptance subscale in the
“Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale” (PHLMS) (1, 19, 20).
Decentering, also referred to as defusion, reification, or meta-
awareness in the literature, is commonly assessed with the
Experiences Questionnaire [EQ, (21)]. However, decentering
is also evaluated in other instruments, including the Toronto
Mindfulness Scale [TMS, (22)], the Southampton Mindfulness
Questionnaire [SMQ, (23)], and the Comprehensive Inventory
of Mindfulness Experience [CHIME, (20)]. Decentering has been
defined as “the ability to observe one’s thoughts and feelings in
a detached manner, as temporary events in the mind, as neither
necessarily true nor reflections of the self ” (24). Studies have
shown that a low level of decentering can, by itself, predict an
earlier relapse in individuals who have recently recovered from
major depression (25). Some reports also suggest that decentering
may be impaired in individuals with borderline personality
disorder, eating behavior disorder, or cocaine dependence (26).
Decentering is closely related to measures of acceptance such
as experiential avoidance and non-acceptance, both included in
the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS), and with
non-judging from the FFMQ (27, 28).
A final but equally important element is non-attachment,
which has its origins in Buddhism. Non-attachment can be
defined as the relative absence of fixation on ideas, images, or
sensory objects and as an absence of internal pressure to obtain,
hold, avoid, or change circumstances or experiences (29). This
construct has been positively associated with meditation practice
(total weekly hours and frequency of practice), suggesting
that regular mindfulness practice may promote non-attachment
(27). The Non-Attachment Scale [NAS, (29)] is an accurate
representation of non-attachment, and as with decentering, it
is closely correlated with acceptance (29), as assessed with the
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II [AAQ-II, (30)] and the
FFMQ non-judging facet (27, 31). Feliu-Soler et al. (27) found a
close association between non-attachment and decentering, and
Allen (32) suggested that decentering appears to be a quality
embedded in non-attachment. Furthermore, non-attachment
to the self—which refers to a decrease in self-referential
processing or Experiential Selfless Processing (33), that is,
processing the present moment subjective experience without
self-referentiality—has been identified as a core mechanism in
mindfulness training (34–36).
It could be argued that acceptance, decentering, and
non-attachment are all intimately connected, not only
psychometrically but also theoretically. “If one grasps onto the
true existence object [by fusion], this gives rise to attachment”
(37). The unaware identification with the content of perception
and thought is one contemporary conceptualization of the
term “ego” (38). This leads to the confusion of our mental
representations with ourselves. As the self-verification theory
suggests, people strongly identify with those representations and
foster, protect, and defend those self-images (39).
When we do not accept something, we are judging it to
be good or bad, and this judgment is fused with a particular
desired outcome that seeks our “own” benefit. Some core themes
in mindfulness-based programs (MBPs) partially represent this
overlapping nature, which can be seen in the concepts of
“aversion” and “craving” in mindfulness-based cognitive therapy
(MBCT), the idea of “letting go” in both mindfulness-based
stress reduction (MBSR) and MBCT, and in radical acceptance
principles and techniques such as “willingness vs. willfulness” in
dialectical behavior therapy (DBT). In all cases, one relinquishes
involvement and frees oneself from the need for things to
be different (40–42). These attitudinal components, which are
closely related to acceptance, could be more stable and reliable
characteristics than the attentional component of mindfulness,
which appear to be mood dependent (2). Given the theoretical
and psychometric correlation among acceptance, decentering,
and non-attachment, we hypothesized that these concepts may,
in fact, be different semantic expressions, or the building blocks,
of the same latent construct. Therefore, we believe that this
new construct could be central to several views of “ego” where
fusion with mental content is a key feature, such as the self-as-
object (38), the analytical self (43), the narrative self (44, 45),
or the self-as-content (46). If this construct is reliable, it would
allow us to better understand a form of self that, when becomes
overidentified, can be the cause of suffering (38). The idea of
a unified self with a sense of agency relies on a coherent set
of beliefs, intentions, and behaviors, and is also represented in
several contemplative traditions (47) that have been taken as a
source of inspiration for some evidence based contemporaneous
psychotherapies (40–42). Those traditions advocate for the idea
of non-self and actions performed, or motivated by lack of
desire (48–50). In all three cases attachment, fusion, and non-
acceptance are part of the equation.
To explore this hypothesis, we sought to analyze the possible
unidimensionality of a general factor underlying acceptance,
decentering, and non-attachment using the non-judging facet
included in the FFMQ, EQ, and NAS scales. Second, we
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TABLE 1 | General socio-demographic variables of the participants according to subsample.
Variables/samples Total sample Subsample 1 Subsample 2 p
(n = 608) (n = 304) (n = 304)
Range Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age, years* 17–75 41.32 11.13 40.91 11.52 41.72 10.72 0.379
Category Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
Gender** Female 374 63.2 191 64.5 183 61.8 0.495
Male 218 36.8 105 35.5 113 38.2
Education** Primary 11 1.9 6 2.0 5 1.7 9.982
Secondary 117 19.8 57 19.3 60 20.3
Diploma 86 14.5 45 15.2 41 13.9
Degree 300 50.7 150 50.7 150 50.7
Ph.D. 78 13.2 38 12.8 40 13.5
Meditation** Yes 335 56.6 160 54.1 175 59.1 0.214
No 257 43.4 136 45.9 121 40.9
SD, standard deviation; Freq, frequencies; %, percentages.
*18 missing values (9 in subsamples 1 and 9 in subsample 2).
**16 missing values (8 in subsamples 1 and 8 in subsample 2).
also hypothesized that this new general construct, which may
subsume these three facets, would be positively correlated
with well-being and negatively correlated with psychopathology.
Therefore, the aim of the present study was to define this
construct and then to perform a preliminary test of its
nomological validity compared with an important positive
psychology index, resilience, and to depressive symptoms.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
A Cross-sectional study was developed with a convenience
sample of Spanish general population participants that were
included if: (1) aged >18 years, (2) able to understand Spanish,
and (3) signed informed consent.
Participants and Procedure
Participants were recruited through several Spanish websites.
An internet-based commercial system specifically designed
to recruit survey samples was used to recruit our sample
(www.surveymonkey.com; Portland, OR, USA). A link
containing the assessment protocol was posted on mindfulness
and meditation focused portals and several mindfulness
associations, sanghas, and Zen monasteries. The non-meditative
convenience samples were enrolled accessing to the link placed
in scientific and psychology research sites and non-professional
social networks (e.g., Facebook). The study protocol was
approved by the corresponding regional health authority, the
Aragon Ethics Committee (CEICA), Spain (registry: PI12/00083)
and all participants signed a consent form indicating their
willingness to participate. Prospective participants were invited
to participate voluntarily in the study and were told that
there would be no monetary compensation. Participants were
informed about the purpose of the study and informed that
all responses would be treated confidentially. Scales were filled
online, with the possibility of using mobile phones or computers,
and time taken was around 20min. A total of 850 subjects
voluntarily agreed to participate; of these, 608 (72%) completed
all of the requirement instruments and questionnaires. Two
randomly selected halves of this sample, with a size of n1 = 304
and n2 = 304, supposing a null hypothesis that RMSEA would
be equal to or <0.04 if the true value was 0.06 (close fit) and an
alpha equal to 0.05 level, under the more conservative model
tested (i.e., only one factor that covers all the items), produces a
power coefficient of 0.99 for the exploratory and confirmatory
factor analyses. The socio-demographic characteristics of the
sample and the randomly-selected subsamples are described in
Table 1.
Measures
First, we collected information on age, gender (male, female),
education (primary, secondary, Associate’s degree, Bachelor’s
degree, Ph.D.), and previous experience with meditation (yes
or no).
The Spanish version of the FFMQ (16, 19) is a tool designed
to evaluate mindfulness. For the purposes of the present study,
we used only the “non-judging of inner experience” dimension
of the FFMQ. This dimension comprises eight items (e.g.,
“I make judgments about whether my thoughts are good or
bad”) that are designed to assess an individual’s ability to
take a non-evaluative stance toward experience. In view of the
existing debate surrounding the most appropriate measure of
acceptance—traditionally associated with non-judging and non-
reactivity FFMQ subscales (18, 20, 51)—we elected to use only
the first subscale as this is more closely associated with other
acceptance measures than the FFMQ non-reactivity subscale,
both in clinical and non-clinical samples (1). Participants were
asked to rate each sentence on a five-point scale ranging from
1 (“never or very rarely true”) to 5 (“very often or always
true”), with higher scores indicating higher levels of non-
judging of inner experience. The Spanish language version of the
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 3 November 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 659835
Soler et al. Decentering, Acceptance, and Non-Attachment
FFMQ scale and subscales has shown appropriate psychometric
properties (19). The composite reliability of non-judging inner
experience in the present study sample was ω = 0.93.
The EQ (21, 26) is used to assess the ability of an individual to
observe their own thoughts and emotions as temporary objects
of the mind, captured under the concept of “decentering.” The
EQ contains 11 items designed tomeasure a metacognitive ability
known as “decentering,” defined as the capacity to observe one’s
thoughts and emotions in a detached manner, considering them
transient events of the mind (e.g., “I can separate myself from
my thoughts and feelings”). Two original items from the EQ (“I
can treat myself kindly” and “I can slow my thinking at times
of stress”) were not included in the present analysis because the
divergent meaning of these items appears to be more closely
related to the self-compassion construct (52). Thus, in the present
study, we used a nine-item version of the EQ scale. All items on
the EQ are scored on a five-point scale, ranging from 1 (“never”)
to 5 (“all the time”), with higher scores indicating a greater
decentering capacity. The Spanish language version of the EQ
has shown adequate psychometric properties (26). The composite
reliability of the final nine decentering items in the present study
was ω = 0.87.
The NAS-7 (31) is a 7-item measure extracted from the
original 30-item NAS. The original NAS-30 (29) was empirically
derived from a pool of items obtained from Buddhist texts about
non-attachment. The NAS-7 is a unidimensional short form that
measures the absence of fixation on ideas, images, or sensory
objects, as well as the absence of internal pressure to obtain,
hold, avoid, or change circumstances or experiences. Items (e.g.,
“I can let go of regrets and feelings of dissatisfaction about the
past”) are scored on a six-point scale ranging from 1 (“strongly
disagree”) to 6 (“strongly agree”), with higher scores indicating
greater levels of non-attachment. NAS-7 has shown good internal
consistency for both meditators and non-meditators (27). The
composite reliability of non-attachment in the present study was
ω = 0.85.
The Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale-10 [CD-RISC-10 (53,
54)] is a self-administered 10-item measure designed to assess
a broad construct of resilience (e.g., “I can deal with whatever
comes”), a protective factor against mental problems that is
positively associated with adaptive coping. Items from the CD-
RISC-10 range from 0 (“not true at all”) to 4 (“true nearly all the
time”). There is a total scale score, with higher scores indicating
greater resilience. The original study on the development of
the CD-RISC in the general population and inpatients provided
support for the internal consistency, test–retest reliability, and
validity of this scale (53). The composite reliability of the CD-
RISC-10 scale in the present study was good, with a value of ω
= 0.91.
The Depression Anxiety Stress Scale, short form [DASS-21
(55, 56)], is a self-administered, 21-item instrument with three
subscales, which assesses depressive symptomatology, anxiety,
and stress. In the present study, we used only the depression
subscale (e.g., “life is meaningless”). The items in that subscale
assess the severity/frequency of symptoms over the previous week
on a four-point scale ranging from 0 (“nothing applicable to
me”) to 3 (“very applicable to me”), with higher scores indicating
greater depressive symptoms. The composite reliability of the
depression subscale in the present study was adequate, with a
value of ω = 0.90.
The selection of 24 items, coming from FMMQ, EQ and NAS-
7, which are the components of the new construct studied, are
specified in the Supplementary Material.
Data Analyses
Sociodemographic data were described as means with standard
deviation (SD) and frequencies (percentages) according to the
statistical distribution of each variable. Possible differences
between two randomly selected subsamples were tested using
t-tests for independent groups and χ2 (or Fisher’s exact
test when necessary) tests depending on the shape of the
score distributions of measures. Individual item distributions
were described in each independent random subsample using
means with SD. Mardia’s statistics were calculated to evaluate
the multivariate behavior of the items. We verified the
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) sampling adequacy values, the
Bartlett’s test of sphericity on the redundancy levels, and the
matrix determinants to rule out multi-colinearity problems.
To determine the underlying factorial structure of the items,
we used Schwartz’s Bayesian information criterion (BIC) as a
dimensionality test in both subsamples.
Item–rest correlations were calculated, and an exploratory
factor analysis (EFA) was performed in the first randomly
selected subsample. The robust maximum likelihood (RML)
method, with correction for robust mean and variance-scaled,
was used for factor extraction. We tested the following models:
(a) one first-order factor, as the simplest solution, taken as a
reference, (b) three correlated first-order factors, maintaining
the origin of the items, (c) the Schmid–Leiman solution, as
an exploratory second order factor approximation, and (d)
exploratory bifactor, allowing for the existence of a general
common factor and three orthogonal sub-factors. Standardized
factor loadings (λ), uniqueness terms (δ), latent inter-factor
correlations (ϕ), and discrepancy values—as unstandardized
residual covariance estimates were also considered. Raw loading
matrices were rotated using the Promin procedure, which allows
factors to be oblique to maximize factor simplicity, without
assuming that all the variables are pure measures of a single
dimension (57). We evaluated factorial simplicity by means of
(a) the index of factor simplicity (IFS), (b) the scale fit index
(SFI), (c) Bentler’s scale-free matrix measure, and (d) hyperplane
counts. IFS and SFI values ≥0.80 are appropriate; Bentler’s
measure ranges from 0 (very complex structures) to 1 (very
simple ones). Hyperplane counts (loadings essentially zero except
for random error) were estimated through the −0.15/+0.15
interval and through the Kaiser and Cerny procedure (58). We
explored closeness to unidimensionality by means of the item
residual absolute loadings (MIREAL) and the explained common
variance (ECV). MIREAL is a measure of departure from
unidimensionality, with values <0.30 indicating no substantial
bias if a unidimensional solution is adopted (59, 60). ECV
represents the proportion of common variance attributable to
the general factor, which should fall within the 0.70–0.85 range
if a solution is to be accepted as unidimensional (61). The
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effectiveness of factor scores was assessed by using the factor
determinacy index (FDI). FDI is the correlation between the
factor score estimates and the levels on the latent factors they
estimate (62), and values of around 80 are considered adequate
(63). Construct replicability is the proportion of the factor
variance that can be accounted for by its indicators, which was
measured by the H index (bounded between 0 and 1) with values
considered appropriate when ≥0.80 (61).
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using the maximum
likelihood (ML) method on the second randomly selected
subsample was conducted to cross-validate the factor structures
obtained in the EFA.The goodness-of-fit was assessed by
chi-square (χ2), chi-square/degrees of freedom (χ2/df), the
comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker–Lewis index (TLI), the
root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and the
standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). Chi-square
is highly sensitive to sample size, so χ2/df was used, which
indicates a good fit when <5 and excellent fit <3 (64, 65). CFI
analyzes the model fit by examining the discrepancy between
the data and the hypothesized model adjusted for the sample
size, and TLI analyzes the discrepancy between the χ2 value of
the hypothesized model and the χ2 value of the null model,
penalizing for the number of parameters. Both CFI and TLI
incremental measures indicate adequate fit when the value is
>0.90, and an excellent fit when >0.95 (64, 66). RMSEA is a
measurement of the error of approximation to the population,
and SRMR is the standardized difference between the observed
and the predicted covariance. Both RMSEA and SRMR absolute
measures indicate adequate fit with values <0.08 and excellent fit
when <0.06 (64, 66).
The omega composite reliability for the total scale (ω), as
well as for each subscale (ωS), were calculated, which may be
interpreted as the square of the correlation between the scale
(ω)—or subscale (ωS)—score, and the latent variable common
to the corresponding indicators (67). We also estimated the
omega hierarchical (ωH), as the proportion of reliable variance
in total scores that can be attributed to the single general
factor, as well as the omega hierarchical subscale (ωHS), as
the proportion of reliable variance associated with each factor
(subscale) after the variance associated with the single general
factor has been partitioned out (68). The average variance
extracted (AVE) was also estimated, defined as the amount
of variance captured by the construct vs. variance due to
measurement error. Some authors suggest that the construct
has convergent validity if AVE ≥ 0.50, but values of ∼0.40
with a composite reliability > 0.60 are considered acceptable
(69). Discriminant validity between factors exists when the
AVE values are greater than the squared correlation between
factors (69). The percentage of uncontaminated correlations
(PUC) was estimated as the number of correlations between
items from different factors divided by the total number of
correlations, which indicates the proportion of correlations
reflecting the possible general factor under study. When
ECV and PUC values are >0.70, common variance can be
regarded as essentially unidimensional, but this is also true
if the PUC is <0.80 but the ECV is >0.60 and the ωH is
>0.70 (61).
Finally, to assess the nomological validity of the proposed
general factor, we evaluated the possible links between the general
factor and the constructs of resilience and depression. To do
so, we constructed a structural equation model (SEM) using the
ML method. We calculated the raw inter-factor standardized
latent correlations between the general factor and the other
constructs, as well as the adjusted standardized links between the
latent variables involved in the model. The explained variance of
the latent variables (R2), as well as the unstandardized residual
covariance, was estimated.
We conducted analyses for participants with non-missing
data. The tests used were bilateral, and the significance
level was α <0.05. The Factor (v.10.9.02) and AMOS (v.20)




Table 1 shows the sociodemographic characteristics of the study
participants. No significant differences were observed between
the two randomly selected subsamples in terms of age, gender,
educational level, or meditation experience.
Exploratory Factor Analyses
Descriptive statistics for all items (subsample 1) are shown in
Table 2. The item-rest correlations were in the same direction
for all items, with values ranging from 0.42 (item NA5) to 0.67
(item NJ3). The results of the BIC dimensionality test suggested a
one-factor solution (Table 3), which explained 39.3% of the total
variance, with loadings (Table 2) between 0.41 (item NA5) and
0.74 (items NJ2 and NJ5). The ECV was 0.80, and the MIREAL
was 0.29; thus, the unidimensionality of data was supported in
the first subsample. Factor determinacy (FDI = 0.97), omega
reliability (ω = 0.93), and construct replicability (H = 0.94) were
all very good, but the goodness of model-data fit for the one-
factor solution was not adequate in terms of RMSEA and SRMR
values (Table 4).
The goodness of model-data fit for a three-factor solution was
better than the previous one-factor solution used as a reference
(Table 4), explaining 55.8% of the total variance; moreover,
loadings were congruent with the item theoretical provenance
(Table 2). The uniqueness terms were lower than observed in the
previous one-factor solution. The general simplicity values were
adequate (see Supplementary Material). The FDI (DE = 0.94;
NJ = 0.97; NA = 0.94), construct replicability (DE: H = 0.89;
NJ: H = 0.93; NA: H = 0.88), and reliability (DE: ωS = 0.87; NJ:
ωS = 0.92; NA: ωS = 0.85) were appropriate. Inter-factor latent
correlations were “DE–NJ” ϕ = 0.56, “DE–NA” ϕ = 0.75, “NJ–
NA” ϕ= 0.58), and AVE was 0.50. Residual covariances were low,
with average absolute values <0.001.
The Schmid–Leiman approximation presented the same
explained variance, uniqueness terms, and fit to the data as
the previous three-factor solution. Loadings in the general
factor ranged from 0.45 (items NJ1 and NJ8) to 0.67 (item
DE3), with positive weights in all of the corresponding
theoretical provenance factors. The pure exploratory bifactor










































TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics of the items and exploratory factor analyses (subsample 1).
One factor Three factors Schmid–Leiman solution Exploratory bifactor
Source Item Mean SD λ δ λ1 λ2 λ3 δ λ1 λ2 λ3 G δ λ1 λ2 λ3 G δ
DE DE1 3.28 0.81 0.48 0.77 0.44 −0.04 0.16 0.70 0.23 −0.03 0.08 0.49 0.70 0.22 −0.09 0.01 0.52 0.68
DE2 3.44 0.92 0.57 0.68 0.44 0.10 0.12 0.64 0.23 0.08 0.06 0.54 0.64 0.24 0.06 0.01 0.53 0.64
DE3 3.23 0.93 0.68 0.54 0.63 0.06 0.12 0.43 0.33 0.04 0.06 0.67 0.43 0.40 0.05 −0.01 0.63 0.40
DE4 3.62 0.78 0.62 0.61 0.71 0.02 0.02 0.47 0.38 0.01 0.01 0.63 0.47 0.35 −0.06 −0.10 0.64 0.46
DE5 3.51 0.80 0.63 0.60 0.41 0.12 0.21 0.56 0.22 0.09 0.10 0.61 0.56 0.26 0.09 0.04 0.59 0.56
DE6 3.69 0.79 0.45 0.80 0.77 −0.11 −0.12 0.60 0.41 −0.08 −0.06 0.48 0.60 0.48 −0.08 −0.14 0.43 0.58
DE7 3.43 1.06 0.51 0.74 0.45 −0.01 0.15 0.67 0.24 −0.01 0.07 0.51 0.67 0.32 0.01 0.04 0.47 0.67
DE8 3.62 1.01 0.49 0.76 0.91 −0.07 −0.25 0.49 0.49 −0.05 −0.12 0.51 0.49 0.53 −0.07 −0.23 0.46 0.47
DE9 3.84 0.86 0.65 0.58 0.66 0.04 0.07 0.46 0.35 0.03 0.03 0.65 0.46 0.39 0.01 −0.05 0.62 0.46
NJ NJ1 3.22 1.10 0.61 0.63 0.16 0.62 −0.10 0.57 0.08 0.47 −0.05 0.45 0.57 −0.49 0.13 −0.35 0.80 0.02
NJ2 3.68 0.96 0.74 0.45 0.12 0.69 0.03 0.39 0.07 0.52 0.01 0.58 0.39 −0.15 0.44 −0.10 0.66 0.37
NJ3 4.05 0.97 0.70 0.51 −0.10 0.80 0.10 0.35 −0.05 0.61 0.05 0.53 0.35 −0.15 0.65 0.01 0.52 0.34
NJ4 3.43 1.06 0.65 0.57 0.01 0.76 −0.02 0.45 0.01 0.57 −0.01 0.48 0.45 −0.18 0.54 −0.09 0.52 0.45
NJ5 3.88 0.97 0.74 0.45 0.04 0.83 −0.02 0.29 0.02 0.62 −0.01 0.56 0.29 −0.09 0.67 −0.07 0.55 0.28
NJ6 4.05 0.91 0.71 0.50 −0.09 0.91 −0.01 0.27 −0.05 0.68 −0.01 0.51 0.27 −0.20 0.71 −0.07 0.52 0.25
NJ7 3.78 1.00 0.65 0.58 0.07 0.65 0.02 0.50 0.04 0.49 0.01 0.50 0.50 0.01 0.56 −0.03 0.46 0.47
NJ8 3.56 1.15 0.63 0.60 0.01 0.80 −0.10 0.43 0.01 0.61 −0.04 0.45 0.43 −0.25 0.53 −0.15 0.53 0.43
NA NA1 4.52 1.42 0.65 0.58 0.02 0.14 0.60 0.51 0.01 0.11 0.28 0.64 0.51 0.11 0.14 0.28 0.62 0.51
NA2 5.22 1.04 0.54 0.71 −0.01 −0.10 0.75 0.52 −0.01 −0.08 0.35 0.60 0.52 0.21 −0.01 0.39 0.54 0.52
NA3 4.93 1.29 0.62 0.62 0.14 −0.02 0.61 0.49 0.07 −0.02 0.29 0.65 0.49 0.23 0.03 0.30 0.60 0.49
NA4 4.94 1.26 0.54 0.71 −0.08 −0.03 0.75 0.54 −0.04 −0.02 0.35 0.58 0.54 0.15 0.06 0.39 0.53 0.54
NA5 5.12 1.07 0.41 0.83 0.14 −0.18 0.55 0.68 0.07 −0.14 0.26 0.48 0.68 0.23 −0.10 0.27 0.44 0.68
NA6 4.91 1.29 0.57 0.67 −0.12 0.01 0.80 0.49 −0.06 0.01 0.37 0.61 0.49 0.09 0.05 0.40 0.58 0.49
NA7 4.96 1.10 0.57 0.67 −0.01 0.07 0.62 0.58 −0.01 0.05 0.29 0.58 0.58 0.16 0.12 0.31 0.52 0.58
SD, standard deviation; Characteristics of the matrix: determinant <0.001; KMO = 0.94; Bartlett’s statistic = 3,702.40 (df = 276; p < 0.001): Mardia’s statistic = 37.71 (p < 0.001).
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model explained 59.6% of the total variance and improved the
fit to the data (Table 4). The uniqueness terms of the DE and NJ
items were decreased, while the NA terms were exactly the same
(Table 2). The general factor (G) presented loadings between 0.43
(item DE6) and 0.80 (NJ1); the AVE was 0.53. The FDI values
were appropriate (DE = 0.92; NJ = 0.92; NA = 0.84; G = 0.98).
The construct replicability of DE (H = 0.85), NJ (H = 0.84)
and the general factor (H = 0.96) were good, but the value of
the NA subscale was fair (H = 0.71). The omega hierarchical of
the general factor was good (ωH = 0.80), but the values of the
subscales were low (DE: ωHS = 0.26; NJ: ωHS = 0.43; NA: ωHS =
0.23). Residual covariances were very low, with average absolute
values <0.001.
Confirmatory Factor Analyses
Descriptive statistics for all items (subsample 2) are shown in
Table 5. The BIC dimensionality test in subsample 2 also resulted
in a one-factor solution (Table 3) that explained 41.1% of the total
variance, with significant loadings in all cases (Table 5), ranging
from 0.37 (itemNA5) to 0.80 (itemNJ3). However, the one-factor
TABLE 3 | BIC dimensionality tests.
Subsample 1 Subsample 2
Factors BIC Factors BIC
0 13,804.41 0 15,113.58
1 8,459.02* 1 8,368.37*
2 9,053.39 2 9,196.81
3 10,303.34 3 10,778.03
*Recommended number of common factors, 1; BIC, Schwartz’s Bayesian
information criterion.
solution had a poor fit to the data (Table 4), as in the previous
EFA, and thus, it was discarded.
The three-correlated factor solution explained 58.4% of total
variance. It showed adequate loadings (Table 5; all significant:
p < 0.001), ranging from 0.51 (item NA5) to 0.87 (item NJ5).
The fit to the data was acceptable (Table 4). The FDI values
were good (DE = 0.94; NJ = 0.97; NA = 0.93). Construct
replicability and reliability estimates were appropriate (DE: H
= 0.88, ωS = 0.87; NJ: H = 0.94, ωS = 0.94; NA: H = 0.96,
ωS = 0.85). Inter-factor latent correlations were as follows:
“DE–NJ” ϕ = 0.58, “DE–NA” ϕ = 0.80, “NJ–NA” ϕ = 0.57;
the AVE was 0.52. Residual co-variances were low and equally
distributed among all the items, with an average absolute value
of 0.04.
The single second-order factor solution presented the same
fit, factor loadings, and uniqueness terms as that obtained in
the three-correlated factor solution, with high and significant
second-order loadings [DE (γ = 0.90, R2 = 0.81, p < 0.001),
NJ (γ = 0.64, R2 = 0.41, p < 0.001), NA (γ = 0.89, R2 = 0.79,
p < 0.001)], and a total omega value of ω = 0.95. The bifactor
model improved the fit to the data (Table 4), and the general
factor (G) showed positive and significant loadings in all the
items (Table 5), ranging from 0.35 (itemNA5) to 0.77 (DE5). The
averaged variance extracted (AVE= 0.54), construct replicability
(H= 0.93), factor determinacy (FDI= 0.89), explained common
variance (ECV = 0.61), and omega hierarchical (ωH = 0.79)
of the general factor were appropriate, with a PUC of 0.69. By
contrast, the partialized subscales were weak in terms of construct
replicability and factor determinacy, except for NJ (DE: H= 0.48,
FDI = 0.32; NJ: H = 0.86, FDI = 0.77; NA: H = 0.52, FDI =
0.49). The omega hierarchical values of the subscales were also
insufficient (DE: ωHS = 0.11; NJ: ωHS = 0.59; NA: ωHS = 0.24).
Residual covariances were low and equally distributed among all
the items, with an average absolute value of 0.02.
TABLE 4 | Fit indexes for the EFA, CFA, and SEM analyses.
Group/Model χ2 df χ2/df CFI TLI RMSEA (90% CI) SRMR
EFA: subsample 1
One-factor 1,233.71* 252 4.90 0.946 0.941 0.092 (0.086–0.098) 0.099
Three correlated factors 377.56* 207 1.82 0.985 0.980 0.053 (0.046–0.060) 0.033
Schmid-Leiman 377.56* 207 1.82 0.985 0.980 0.053 (0.046–0.060) 0.033
Exploratory bifactor 302.45* 186 1.63 0.986 0.980 0.053 (0.046–0.060) 0.030
CFA: subsample 2
One-factor 1,386.54* 252 5.50 0.713 0.686 0.122 (0.116–0.128) 0.110
Three correlated factors 432.29* 249 1.74 0.954 0.949 0.049 (0.041–0.057) 0.045
One second-order factor 432.29* 249 1.74 0.954 0.949 0.049 (0.041–0.057) 0.045
Bifactor model 362.16* 228 1.59 0.966 0.959 0.044 (0.035–0.052) 0.041
Total sample
Bifactor model 439.25* 228 1.93 0.971 0.965 0.039 (0.034–0.045) 0.029
Structural model (SEM) 1,509.97* 752 2.01 0.944 0.938 0.041 (0.038–0.044) 0.046
χ2, minimum value of the discrepancy; df, degrees of freedom; CFI, comparative fit index; TLI, Tucker-Lewis index; RMSEA (90% CI), root mean square error of approximation (90%
confidence interval); SRMR, standardized root mean square residual.
*p < 0.001; EFA, exploratory factor analyses; CFA, confirmatory factor analyses; SEM, structural equation modeling (The graphical representation of SEM is in Figure 1).
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TABLE 5 | Descriptive statistics of the items and confirmatory factor analyses (subsample 2).
One factor Three factors† Bifactor model
Source Item Mean SD λ δ λ specific δ λ specific G δ
EQ DE1 3.30 0.83 0.50*** 0.75 0.62*** 0.62 0.18* 0.58*** 0.63
DE2 3.42 0.90 0.57*** 0.68 0.66*** 0.56 −0.01 0.69*** 0.52
DE3 3.18 0.88 0.50*** 0.75 0.69*** 0.52 0.19** 0.65*** 0.55
DE4 3.53 0.86 0.49*** 0.76 0.64*** 0.59 0.26*** 0.58*** 0.60
DE5 3.47 0.83 0.61*** 0.63 0.71*** 0.50 −0.06 0.77*** 0.40
DE6 3.65 0.74 0.46*** 0.79 0.54*** 0.71 0.32*** 0.47*** 0.68
DE7 3.37 1.05 0.39*** 0.85 0.56*** 0.69 0.20** 0.52*** 0.69
DE8 3.51 0.96 0.54*** 0.71 0.68*** 0.54 0.51*** 0.57*** 0.42
DE9 3.78 0.77 0.60*** 0.64 0.79*** 0.38 0.45*** 0.70*** 0.31
NJ NJ1 3.21 1.07 0.67*** 0.55 0.73*** 0.47 0.62*** 0.40*** 0.37
NJ2 3.68 1.01 0.75*** 0.44 0.80*** 0.36 0.63*** 0.48*** 0.31
NJ3 3.97 1.03 0.80*** 0.36 0.83*** 0.31 0.62*** 0.55*** 0.37
NJ4 3.39 1.08 0.76*** 0.42 0.80*** 0.36 0.62*** 0.50*** 0.23
NJ5 3.80 0.99 0.79*** 0.38 0.87*** 0.24 0.74*** 0.47*** 0.30
NJ6 3.87 0.98 0.79*** 0.38 0.84*** 0.29 0.66*** 0.52*** 0.34
NJ7 3.77 1.01 0.78*** 0.39 0.81*** 0.34 0.62*** 0.52*** 0.29
NJ8 3.54 1.11 0.79*** 0.38 0.84*** 0.29 0.66*** 0.53*** 0.46
NAS NA1 4.58 1.35 0.56*** 0.69 0.75*** 0.44 0.29*** 0.68*** 0.45
NA2 5.13 1.12 0.52*** 0.73 0.65*** 0.58 0.30*** 0.57*** 0.59
NA3 4.94 1.25 0.53*** 0.72 0.74*** 0.45 0.32*** 0.66*** 0.46
NA4 4.80 1.25 0.61*** 0.63 0.73*** 0.47 0.37*** 0.62*** 0.48
NA5 4.96 1.10 0.37*** 0.86 0.51*** 0.74 0.47*** 0.35*** 0.65
NA6 4.81 1.17 0.52*** 0.73 0.66*** 0.56 0.43*** 0.53*** 0.53
NA7 4.82 1.08 0.54*** 0.71 0.67*** 0.55 0.31*** 0.59*** 0.56
SD, standard deviation; Characteristics of the matrix, determinant <0.001; KMO = 0.95; Bartlett’s statistic = 4,108.80 (df = 276; p < 0.001), Mardia’s statistic = 31.98 (p < 0.001);
λ, loading; δ, uniqueness; G, general factor; EQ, experiences questionnaire; NJ, non-judging (from the FFMQ); NAS, non-attachment scale.
†
The one second-order model showed the same specific loadings and uniqueness terms as the three-factor model, *p < 0.001, ** p < 0.005, *** p < 0.05.
Nomological Validity
Given the appropriateness of the general factor (G) resulting
from the bifactormodel, we tested the nomological validity of this
factor for resilience and depression in the full sample (n = 608).
As shown in Table 4, the measurement bifactor model of the new
construct fit the data well in the total sample. In addition, the
fit indexes of the structural nomological model were acceptable,
with the following values: χ2 = 1,509.97; df = 752 (p < 0.001);
χ2/df = 2.01; CFI = 0.944; TLI = 0.938; RMSEA (90% CI) =
0.041 (0.038–0.044); and SRMR = 0.046. The raw inter-factor
latent correlations between the constructs showed the following
values: “G–resilience” ϕ = 0.81, p < 0.001; “G–depression” ϕ =
−0.66, p < 0.001; “resilience–depression” ϕ =−0.58, p < 0.001).
The results of the structural model are represented in Figure 1. As
that figure shows, all the factorial loadings of the general factor
(G) resulting from the bifactor model, as well as the factorial
loadings of the other constructs (e.g., resilience and depression),
were significant. The explanatory power of the general factor
(G) on resilience and depression were, respectively, R2 = 0.65
(β = 0.81, p < 0.001) and R2 = 0.44 (β = −0.55, p < 0.001).
The adjusted link between resilience–depression showed a non-
significant value (β = −0.13, p = 0.070). Residual co-variances
were low and equally distributed among all the items, with a
mean absolute value of 0.03.
DISCUSSION
The main objective of this study was to test the hypothesis
that there is an underlying general factor beyond the constructs
of acceptance, decentering, and non-attachment. Despite the
apparent semantic differences among them, they have shown
to be psychometrically closely related (31, 70). Our findings
suggest that a more general factor that subsumes all three of these
components appears to exist. Considering the content of the
referred domains and the theoretical connection among them,
suggested by contemplative authors (71–73), we decided to label
this general factor “Delusion of Me” (DoM) (Figure 1).
This idea of a general factor was explored and confirmed
through various analytical models applied to two distinct,
randomly selected subsamples. Considering the three correlated,
first-order factor model and following the criteria proposed by
Fornell and Larcker (69), we established convergent validity
among the original components (non-judgment, decentering,
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FIGURE 1 | Nomological validity of the “Delusion of Me” (DoM) general factor regarding resilience and depression. Structural equations model of the nomological
validity of the “Delusion of Me” (DoM) general factor regarding the constructs of “resilience” and “depression.” The circles represent latent components, and the
rectangles are observable variables (items). One-way arrows represent factor loadings (in the measurement model) or standardized slopes (in the structural model).
Dashed lines represent non-significant values in the corresponding factor loadings or standardized slopes (i.e., p > 0.05). *p < 0.001.
and non-attachment). However, discriminant validity was only
observed between decentering and non-judgment, and between
non-attachment and non-judgment; in other words, decentering
and non-attachment appear to be very closely related facets. The
bifactor approximation was the model that best fit the data. Based
on this model, the ECV—given the context of the PUC and ωH
values obtained—suggested the one-dimensional nature of the
pool of items, with adequate loadings on the general factor and
appropriate fit indexes (61). Simplicity and factor determinacy
were good, and the factor score estimates unambiguously
reflected the latent levels of the general factor they attempted
to estimate (62). The AVE, ωH, and the H index were also
appropriate, indicating that the general factor was well-defined
(61). However, the original theoretical subscales (e.g., non-
judgment, decentering, and non-attachment) remained marginal
in practically all psychometric indexes after adjusting for the
general factor. This suggests that the unique characteristics of
each may be minimal when compared with the shared common
aspects present in the general factor that seems to group them.
We have seen that several statistical indices support the
unidimensional construct represented by the item pools of the
self-report measures of non-judging, decentering, and non-
attachment. However, failure to obtain an excellent fit for a single
factor model and equally excellent fit for three correlated factors
and a second-order factor (linked with the first-order factors
of non-judging, decentering, and non-attachment) suggests
plausible alternative hypotheses. For instance, the best fit of the
bifactor model does not deny the observation of an excellent
fit for the three-factor structure with a second-order factor of
DoM (that can be obtained as an aggregate of the scores of
the three factors). Furthermore, in the bifactor model, items
of all the three factors loaded significantly on the respective
latent factors (except two items of decentering) even after
fragmenting the general factor of the DoM. Therefore, this also
may be considered to support the notion that the constructs
of non-judging, decentering, and non-attachment, even though
correlating with each other and jointly representing the higher
order constructs of the DoM, also represent constructs closely
related to mindfulness itself.
The term “delusion” is related to the lack of decentering.
Cognitive fusion refers to a mental process in which verbal
events (i.e., thoughts) prevail over direct experience in terms of
influence on behavior (46). As a result, the individual begins
to respond to mental constructs as if they were physical facts
(25, 74). On the contrary, decentering enables the individual to let
go of needless entanglement with private experiences (46) such
are thoughts and emotions. Decentering includes three separate
components: meta-awareness of subjective experience, reduced
reactivity to thought content, and dis-identification from internal
experience (75). Decentering allows us to step back from an
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experience to examine it as separate from the self and to facilitate
dis-identification from internal experience. In Buddhism and
contextual sciences this conceptual self is an illusion (46, 73, 76,
77). People describe themselves in terms of their roles, history,
attributes, and dispositions that blended all together constitute
our narrative self that, through fusion, became “facts” (46).
Although illusory, this entity has intentionality, an interest in
obtaining certain results and not others (78). This fundamental
mismatch between this simplified way of perceiving the world,
based on personal preferences, and the true nature of reality is
what Buddhism calls “ignorance” (72). Ignorance refers to the
illusion that—beyond our preferences, impressions, or mental
events—there is something that constitutes a separate entity,
which could be called a self (78). This “mistakenly reified self-
image” (44) emerges out of the “mental simulation” conforming
the self.
The closest related psychological term to DoM is the self-as-a-
content, a construct pertaining to Acceptance and Commitment
Therapy (46), in which any private experience or content
becomes the self by fusion or identification. In other words, our
self becomes our current particular content of mind. When I say
“my body,” the self becomes the owner of the body. The self is our
vision when “I see. . . ” and my thought when I say, “I think. . . ”
(79). When an individual identifies with a particular self-concept
(i.e., I’m the kind of person who . . . ) alternative views are less
likely to be seen and inconsistencies are threatening (39, 46).
Interestingly, narrative self that could be considered a by-
product of self-as-content, has been linked to medial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC) activity while the experiential self, momentary
self-reference centered on the present without selecting any
sensory object, with pervasive reductions in the same area
and increased engagement of a right lateralized network (44).
MPFC, among other areas, and the left hemisphere dominance
on “autobiographical-self ” vs. non-verbal bodily processes or
“core self ” was also pointed out in later research, also targeting
sources of self-reference (80). On the other hand, decentering
from default mode of egocentricity was associated with greater
response within the posterior insula, supramarginal gyrus, and
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, with a tendency toward greater
right hemisphere involvement (81).
The essence of attachment relies on grasping or clinging to
things, others, or even our own self (73). Sahdra et al. (29, 31)
stated that attachment requires being stuck or fixated on ideas,
images, or sensory objects, and feeling an internal pressure to
acquire, hold, avoid, or change them. By contrast, as previously
stated, acceptance could be defined as “experiencing events fully
and without defense, as they are” (82). This also implies that
the individual does not try to change, avoid, or escape from a
given experience (74, 83). Along these lines, the idea of grasping,
clinging, or “feeling an internal pressure to” is similar to the
absence of acceptance and similar to the notion of working either
against or in favor of a particular outcome. Both non-acceptance
and attachment have in common the transition from preference
to need through fusion.
Most people are attached to their constructs of self. This is
the origin of a myriad of problems (84). If their self-narrative
happens to be negative, it feeds aversion and avoidance. If
the self-narrative is positive, attachment arises, and people
may overestimate themselves and inadvertently cause harm to
themselves and others.
The DoM index enables us to measure the degree to which
expectancy of a certain outcome is confounded with actual facts.
More precisely, the degree to which preferences are converted
into desires of influence and become strong demands to “the
reality,” in other words, the overestimation of one’s own capacity
to alter the events.
In this sense, DoM index is also inversely related to the
concept of wei-wu-wei, the Taoist notion whereby an action
is performed without an intention, and the mental process
is not a means to achieve any end (53), or the concept of
“reflexive awareness” from Buddhism where the phenomenal
form of subjectivity is presented in an intransitive way (85). The
DoM index is also coherent with the idea of a “false sense of
authorship” in the Vedanta tradition in which the belief that we
are in control of our will is a delusion (85–87). Finally, from
the contextual behavioral science perspective also, there is no
agency, and every thought, as any other behavior, is defined
by a limited number of variables (88). For instance, the self in
Skinner’s approach has to do with responding under the control
of the environment (77).The data obtained in the present study
indicate that DoM might have a powerful influence on suffering
(considering depression as an index), even when compared with
resilience. Nevertheless, additional research is needed to further
explore the DoM role on psychopathology.
The DoM approach offers two significant advantages over
other approaches: first, as its referents, its potential as a
transdiagnostic construct. We performed a preliminary test to
determine the association between theDoM index and a common
clinical index (e.g., depressive symptoms). As expected, self-
reported symptoms of depression were inversely and significantly
related to DoM. This finding is congruent with previous studies
that have consistently reported inverse correlations between
acceptance, decentering, and non-attachment with depression
indexes in both clinical and non-clinical populations (1, 2, 28,
29, 89). Nevertheless, future research testing the relation between
the DoM and the existent psychopathology related to depression
is needed to draw the potential transdiagnostic nature and utility
of the construct.
As we hypothesized, there was also a strong positive and
significant association between the DoM index and resilience.
Resilience is a broad construct (with no single definition)
that includes various aspects of psychological resistance (90).
Resilience could be described as a multidimensional factor that
moderates negative emotions and distress, thereby facilitating
a flexible adaptation to suboptimal conditions (91). There is
substantial empirical evidence that psychological resilience can
help an individual to regain or maintain physical and mental
health (92–94). Interestingly, when resilience, depression, and
DoM were considered together (Figure 1), resilience lost its
explanatory power over depression symptom scores and was
submerged by the power of DoM to explain depressive mood.
It should be noted that all three DoM constituents have been
considered relevant in “third wave” clinical approaches. For
instance, in Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, flexible and
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healthy psychological functioning relies on the six corners of the
hexaflex model (i.e., flexible attention to the present moment,
acceptance, defusion, self as a context, values, and committed
action) two of which are contained in DoM (46). Along
with ACT, therapies such MBCT, mindfulness-based relapse
prevention (MBRP) and DBT exactly or similar terms such as
non-reactivity, non-judgmental, aversion, craving, acceptance,
willingness, “letting go,” decentering, or defusion are defined and
specifically targeted within the therapy process. Congruently, the
three DoM constituents have been studied as mechanisms of
change for “third wave” clinical approaches when targeting a
wide diversity of mental disorders such as depression, anxiety,
substance use disorders, and personality disorders (95–98).
In this regard, our findings suggest that, by training one
of these facets, the individual would actually train all three. If
this is true, it could help to tailor the individual’s treatment
according to their specific needs and preferences. For example,
a given individual may be reluctant to practice mindfulness
of thoughts to promote decentering, but could be more open
to psycho-education to foster acceptance, or to self-distancing
training (89) and track the impermanence of experiences (90)
to increase defusion or to random acts of kindness (99) to
encourage non-attachment. In this regard, future studies should
analyze the utility and the potential therapeutic value of this
new construct. As Fahlberg and Fahlberg (100) suggest, if
we could only weaken the hold of our conditioned thoughts,
emotions, and behaviors this could lead to a more pro-social
and rational life and therefore mitigate the negative social and
environmental consequences of egoic behavior and lifestyles
(101). The second strength of the DoM index is that it
appears to be psychometrically tenable. As we stated in the
introduction, the currently available measures of mindfulness
are inconsistent and poorly correlated. In a recent review,
Park et al. (14) concluded that “. . . the current mindfulness
scales have important conceptual differences and none can be
clearly recommended based on their psychometric properties.
Researchers should proceed with caution before optimizing
any mindfulness intervention based on existing scales.” In this
regard, approximately half of the studies involving mindfulness-
based interventions either fail to show any significant pre-post
treatment effect in self-reported measures of mindfulness, or the
outcomes are no better than those obtained with other active
interventions (102), pointing to weaknesses in the tools used to
measure the effects of mindfulness practice. We consider DoM as
a trait measure, since EQ, NAS, and FFMQ fail on this category.
Similarly, we also think on DoM, mainly, as a by-product of
mindfulness practice since Decentering and Non-attachment can
be considered as consequences of mindfulness (27, 70). On
the other hand, from a Western point of view of mindfulness,
acceptance is part of it, rather than an aftermath (7). Although
our study does not include any pre-post assessment, we think that
it is highly likely that the DoM index will be sensitive to change
given the strong sensitivity of its components (i.e., EQ, NAS, and
Non-Judgment from FFMQ) (26, 27, 103).
DoM intends to be useful in assessing interventions targeting
“ego.” The identification with thoughts that represent things and
ideas transfer the sense of identity from them to our self. As
Tolle (104) pointed out, when “my toy” is broken or taken away,
intense suffering arises, not because of the intrinsic value of the
toy, but because of the thought of “mine.” The toy becomes part
of the child’s developing sense of self, of “I,” and, as we see, the
pronoun “mine” is inseparable of the attachment quality. Finally,
attachment and lack of acceptance seem to be the heads and tails
of the same phenomenon, and have the outcomes that “I” want.
Recently, it has been proposed the term “hypo-egoic” to
describe states where (1) conceptual self-awareness is low; (2)
the phenomenal self is not highly individuated from its context;
and (3) the person is not selfishly invested in the outcome
of a particular situation (105). The usual egoic form of self
contributes to depression, anxiety, anger, jealousy, and other
negative emotions that we experience. It enables us to ruminate
and, interpersonally, undermine our relationships, and it can be
a source of social conflict by promoting dislike for those who are
different from us (106).
In summary, DoM index is psychometrically robust and
could be a reliable measure in mindfulness field. The construct
may function as a transdiagnostic index to measure the
overestimation of one’s own capacity to alter the events. DoM
appears to be powerful connected to both negative affect
and resilience. Additionally, and beyond the strictly individual
assessment, the construct has the potential to be useful in
relation to prosocial and lifestyle variables and in the context of
interventions designed to induce a “hypo-egoic” effect.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The main limitation of the present study is that the results are
based only on a limited number of instruments, despite the wide
variety of scales that could have been used to assess these three
constructs. Moreover, other constructs such as equanimity or
compassion could have been included in the model, as these have
indirect implications for self-concept and self-reference (79). In
addition, all of the measures used in this study were self-reported,
with the inherent potential for bias such as social desirability or
acquiescence. In particular, the possibility of “common method
bias” should not be discarded, as using the same methodology
to assess different constructs often loads on a single factor due
to the similarity of the assessment, and not because of content
overlap between the constructs. The participant recruitment and
methodology of survey over regional online websites and social
media could have also hamper the generalizability of our results.
Another limitation is that, although we assessed the association
betweenDoM and depression, our sample did not include clinical
diagnosis, and therefore, we do not know the clinical applicability
of our findings. In addition, the study design does not allow
us to make causal inferences between variables, and also the
role of possible confounders was not evaluated. Nevertheless,
it is worth highlighting that one important strength was the
use of two randomly selected sub-samples to cross-validate
results obtained.
Future research must consider other outcomes related to
this construct, ideally including ecological measurement models
of mindfulness in daily life. Additionally, the utility of the
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DoM concept in clinical samples should be tested in future
research, especially through longitudinal studies to test causal
inferences. In summary, DoM emerges as a robust, potentially
transdiagnostic concept, with possible influences on well-
being, but further studies should analyze its utility at the
therapeutic level.
CONCLUSIONS
The study shows that there is a general factor that subsumes the
constructs of acceptance, decentering, and non-attachment. We
used analytical models applied to two distinct, randomly selected
subsamples, but despite the apparent semantic differences among
them, they have shown to be psychometrically closely related.
Thus, we have labeled it as “Delusion of Me” (DoM) to refer to
the delusion of control of our will, of our “self.” This construct
appears to correlate negatively to psychopathology and positively
to resilience.
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